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NOTES
CROSS-CERTIFICATION TEACHER TENURE
PROBLEMS IN OHIO
I. INTRODUCTIONC ROSS-CERTIFICATION IS THE PROCESS by which a teacher seeks to
satisfy the statutory requirements of tenure by relying on a profes-
sional, permanent, or life certificate in a field other than the field in
which the teacher is employed. The Ohio Revised Code does not directly
address the question of whether a teacher can cross-certify to obtain
tenure. The appellate courts of Ohio are evenly divided on the question
of whether cross-certification is statutorily permissible: three decisions
have concluded that it is permissible, and three have concluded that it is
not. This note will examine the decisions and statutes which pertain to
cross-certification and will suggest that the better statutory interpreta-
tion is to permit cross-certification.
II. THE PROCESS BY WHICH TENURE IS OBTAINED IN OHIO
Since familiarity with the process by which tenure is obtained in Ohio
is a prerequisite to understanding the concept of cross-certification, it is
necessary first to examine the relevant portions of Title 33 of the Ohio
Revised Code which establish the requirements for obtaining tenure.
Ohio Revised Code section 3319.08 provides that a teacher may be
employed under either a limited contract or a continuing contract.' A
limited contract is statutorily defined as a term contract which cannot
exceed five years.2 It offers no tenure protections; at the expiration of
the term, the board of education can elect not to renew the contract if
proper notice is furnished to the teacher prior to April 30th.8 Further,
the contract is subject to nonrenewal without regard to the length of
Section 3319.08 states:
Contracts for the employment of teachers shall be of two types,
limited contracts and continuing contracts. A limited contract for a
superintendent is a contract for such term as authorized by section
3319.01 of the Revised Code, and for all other teachers for a term not to
exceed five years. A continuing contract is a contract which shall remain
in effect until the teacher resigns, elects to retire, or is retired pursuant
to section 3307.37 of the Revised Code or until it is terminated or sus-
pended and shall be granted only to teachers holding professional, per-
manent, or life certificates ....
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3319.08 (Page 1978).
2 Id
' See id § 3319.11 5, set out at note 8 infra.
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previous employment.' A teacher possessing only a provisional or tem-
porary certificate, 5 as opposed to a professional, permanent, or life cer-
tificate,' may be employed only under a limited contract.'
An individual obtains tenure by becoming employed under a continu-
ing contract, as opposed to a limited contract.8 To become eligible for
See id. 4, set out at note 8 infra.
State Bd. Educ. Reg. EDb-3301-21-10 provides that a provisional teachers
certificate will be issued to the holder of a bachelor's degree.
6 See notes 10-12 infra and accompanying text. To avoid unnecessary repeti-
tion throughout the text of this article, all discussions pertaining to professional
certificates apply equally to permanent and life certificates.
' OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 3319.08 (Page 1978), set out at note 1 supra.
' Ohio Revised Code section 3319.11 establishes the requirements for obtain-
ing tenure by Ohio teachers. Because of its importance in this discussion, this sec-
tion is presented in its entirety:
3319.11. Continuing service status and contract, limited contract;
failure of board or superintendent to act.
Teachers eligible for continuing service status in any school district
shall be those teachers qualified as to certification, who within the last
five years have taught for at least three years in the district, and those
teachers who, having attained continuing contract status elsewhere,
have served two years in the district, but the board of education, upon
the recommendation of the superintendent of schools, may at the time of
employment or at any time within such two-year period, declare any of
the latter teachers eligible.
Upon the recommendation of the superintendent that a teacher eligi-
ble for continuing service status be re-employed, a continuing contract
shall be entered into between the board and such teacher unless the
board by a three-fourths vote of its full membership rejects the recom-
mendation of the superintendent. The superintendent may recommend
re-employment of such teacher, if continuing service status has not pre-
viously been attained elsewhere, under a limited contract for not to ex-
ceed two years, provided that written notice of the intention to make
such recommendation has been given to the teacher with reasons
directed at the professional improvement of the teacher on or before the
thirtieth day of April, and provided that written notice from the board
of education of its action on the superintendent's recommendation has
been given to the teacher on or before the thirtieth day of April, but
upon subsequent re-employment only a continuing contract may be
entered into. If the board of education does not give such teacher writ-
ten notice of its action on the superintendent's recommendation of a
limited contract for not to exceed two years before the thirtieth day of
April, such teacher is deemed re-employed under a continuing contract
at the same salary plus any increment provided by the salary schedule.
Such teacher is presumed to have accepted employment under such con-
tinuing contract unless he notifies the board in writing to the contrary
on or before the first day of June, and a continuing contract shall be ex-
ecuted accordingly.
A teacher eligible for continuing contract status employed under an
additional limited contract for not to exceed two years pursuant to writ-
ten notice from the superintendent of his intention to make such recom-
mendation, is, at the expiration of such limited contract, deemed re-em-
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employment under a continuing contract, a teacher must first possess
either a professional, permanent, or life certificate.' To convert the basic
provisional certificate into the more desirable professional or perma-
nent certificate, a teacher must meet the standards of preparation, ex-
perience, and teaching success established by the State Board of Educa-
tion." Currently, to convert a provisional certificate into a professional
ployed under a continuing contract at the same salary plus any increment
granted by the salary schedule, unless the employing board, acting on
the superintendent's recommendation as to whether or not the teacher
should be re-employed, gives such teacher written notice of its intention
not to re-employ him on or before the thirtieth day of April. Such
teacher is presumed to have accepted employment under such continu-
ing contract unless he notifies the board in writing to the contrary on or
before the first day of June, and a continuing contract shall be executed
accordingly.
A limited contract may be entered into by each board with each
teacher who has not been in the employ of the board for at least three
years and shall be entered into, regardless of length of previous employ-
ment, with each teacher employed by the board who holds a provisional
or temporary certificate.
Any teacher employed under a limited contract, and not eligible to be
considered for a continuing contract, is, at the expiration of such limited
contract, deemed re-employed under the provisions of this section at the
same salary plus any increment provided by the salary schedule unless
the employing board, acting on the superintendent's recommendation as
to whether or not the teacher should be re-employed, gives such teacher
written notice of its intention not to re-employ him on or before the thir-
tieth day of April. Such teacher is presumed to have accepted such
employment unless he notifies the board in writing to the contrary on or
before the first day of June, and a written contract for the succeeding
school year shall be executed accordingly. The failure of the parties to
execute a written contract shall not void the automatic re-employment
of such teacher.
The failure of a superintendent of schools to make a recommendation
to the board of education under any of the conditions set forth in this
section, or the failure of the board of education to give such teacher a
written notice pursuant to this section shall not prejudice or prevent a
teacher from being deemed re-employed under either a limited or contin-
uing contract as the case may be under the provisions of this section.
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3319.11 (Page 1978). For commentary pertinent to
teacher tenure law in Ohio, see Baldwin's Ohio School Law § 63.06 (7th ed. 1970);
Comment, Teacher Reemployment, 3 OHIO N.L. REV. 210 (1975).
O See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3319.08 (Page 1978), set out at note 1 supra.
10 Ohio Revised Code section 3319.25 states: "The state board of education
may convert any provisional certificate or renewal thereof into a professional cer-
tificate of like type valid for eight years, provided the applicant has met the stan-
dards of preparation, experience, and teaching success set by the board for the
conversion applied for." Id § 3319.25. Similarly, "[t]he state board of education
may convert any professional certificate or renewal thereof into a permanent cer-
tificate of like type provided the applicant has met the standards of preparation,
experience, and teaching success set by the said board for the conversion applied
for. All permanent certificates shall be countersigned by the superintendent of
public instruction." Id. § 3319.26.
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certificate the teacher must demonstrate twenty-seven months of suc-
cessful teaching experience in Ohio and must complete the equivalent of
thirteen semester hours in professional education subsequent to the
granting of the provisional certificate." To convert a professional cer-
tificate into a permanent certificate the teacher must demonstrate
forty-five months of successful teaching experience under the profes-
sional certificate and must have attained a masters degree or its
equivalent. 2
Once the teacher possesses a professional certificate and has taught
in the school district at least three of the prior five years, the teacher is
eligible under Ohio Revised Code section 3319.11 (Teacher Tenure Act)
to receive a continuing contract which provides tenure rights. Upon in-
itially satisfying these certification and length of employment re-
quirements, the teacher may be re-employed by the board of education
in one of the following three manners. First, the superintendent may
recommend that the teacher's employment be extended under a continu-
ing contract, and the recommendation will prevail unless three-fourths
of the entire school board reject it." Second, the superintendent may
recommend that the teacher be re-employed under an additional limited
contract, which is not to exceed two years." Upon the expiration of this
two-year limited contract, however, the superintendent must either
issue the teacher a continuing contract or terminate the teacher's
employment."6 Third, the superintendent may re-employ the teacher
without qualification. When this occurs, the Ohio Supreme Court has in-
terpreted the contract as being a continuing contract. 6
A teacher who acquires tenure by receiving a continuing contract pur-
suant to section 3319.11 is entitled to automatic re-employment there-
after. "'7 Termination of a tenured teacher is effectuated only upon a
showing of gross inefficiency, immorality, wilful and persistent viola-
tions of reasonable regulations of the board of education, or other good
and just cause. 8
" State Bd. Educ. Reg. EDb-3301-21-14(E).
11 State Bd. Educ. Reg. EDb-3301-21-14(G).
, See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3319.11 2 (Page 1978), set out at note 8 supra.
" See id. 1 3, set out at note 8 supra.
" Id An individual does not automatically acquire continuing contract status
simply because of eligibility. At this crucial junction the individual must be
employed under a continuing contract or not re-employed at all. See State ex rel
Hura v. Board of Educ., 51 Ohio St. 2d 19, 364 N.E.2d 864 (1977).
18 State ex rel- Gandy v. Board of Educ., 26 Ohio St. 2d 115, 269 N.E.2d 605
(1971).
', See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3319.08 (Page 1978), set out at note 1 supra.
18 Id § 3319.16. This section also formulates notice requirements, rights to a
hearing, and the right to judicial review. For a discussion of dismissal because of
a teacher's unauthorized absence or tardiness see Annot., 78 A.L.R.3d 117 (1977).
For a discussion of dismissal due to a teacher's sexual conduct see Annot., 78
A.L.R.3d '19 (1977). "Insubordination" is discussed at Annot., 78 A.L.R.3d 83
(1977).
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III. THE PROBLEM OF CROSS-CERTIFICATION
The dispute over whether cross-certification is statutorily permissible
arises from the fact that it is not specifically addressed by statute. Ohio
Revised Code section 3319.11 states:
Teachers eligible for continuing service status in any school
district shall be those teachers qualified as to certification, who
within the last five years have taught for at least three years in
the district....
Upon the recommendation of the superintendent that a
teacher eligible for continuing service status be re-employed, a
continuing contract shall be entered into between the board and
such teacher .... 19
Accordingly, four requirements must be satisfied before an individual
obtains tenure: (1) the individual must be a "teacher"; (2) the individual
must be "qualified as to certification"; (3) the individual must have
taught three of the last five years within the school system; and (4) the
individual must receive the recommendation of the superintendent. No
recommendation is necessary, however, when a teacher who is eligible
for continuing contract status has subsequently been re-employed under
a limited two-year contract and, upon its expiration, has not been given
notice prior to April 30th of the superintendent's decision not to re-
employ the individual. 0 The disputes which arise between a teacher and
a board of education over whether the last two of these requirements
have been satisfied are not pertinent to the issue of cross-certification.
Also, although the question of who qualifies as a "teacher" for purposes
of section 3319.11 has received extensive judicial examination in the
past, the definition of "teacher" is a relatively stable judicial concept to-
day.21
The dispute over whether cross-certification is statutorily permissible
arises from the requirement that the individual must be "qualified as to
certification." This requirement refers to section 3319.08,1 which states:
"A continuing contract ... shall be granted only to teachers holding pro-
fessional, permanent, or life certificates."" Accordingly, an individual
cannot become eligible to receive tenure until that individual possesses
either a professional, permanent, or life certificate. The question which
is not specifically addressed by any section of Title 33 is whether an in-
19 OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 3319.11 (Page 1978). The statute also provides that
an individual who has obtained tenure elsewhere is eligibile for tenure in the new
school system after only two years. Id.
Id. 3, set out at note 8 supra.
" For a discussion of who qualifies as a "teacher" for purposes of Ohio Revised
Code section 3319.11, see notes 55-62, 78-87 infra and accompanying text.
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3319.08 (Page 1978), set out at note 1 supra.
U id
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dividual who possesses multiple teaching certificates, of which at least
one is a professional certificate and at least one is a provisional cer-
tificate, must possess the professional certificate in the area in which he
is employed, or whether the requirement of being "qualified as to cer-
tification" can be satisfied by possessing the professional certificate in
any teaching area and not necessarily in the area in which the individual
is employed.
The acquisition of tenure is a time-consuming process. During this
period many teachers are "promoted" within the educational hierarchy
to the positions of guidance counselors, assistant principals, principals,
supervisors, and superintendents. Other teachers change their areas of
certification from one field to another. The question of whether a
teacher who has been "promoted" or has changed fields of interest can
utilize the professional certificate in his or her original teaching area to
help satisfy the statutory requirements of tenure, even though he or she
does not possess a professional certificate in the new area, becomes
vitally important to the teacher seeking tenure. Ohio courts must
answer this question of the validity of cross-certification in one of the
following three ways: (1) the teacher is eligible for tenure in the new
field; (2) the teacher is eligible for tenure in the school system, but not
necessarily entitled to tenure in the new field; or (3) the teacher is not
eligible for tenure at all unless he or she is re-employed in the original
field for which a professional certificate is held or until a professional
certificate is acquired for the new field. No Ohio court has held the first
answer to be the correct one. The appellate courts, however, are cur-
rently divided as to which of the remaining two answers is proper.
IV. CASES REFUSING To ALLOW CROSS-CERTIFICATION
As noted, one requirement which must be satisfied before tenure can
be granted is that the individual be "qualified as to certification." Three
appellate courts which have examined this requirement have inter-
preted it as requiring a professional, permanent, or life certificate in the
particular area in which the individual is employed while seeking tenure
and hence have denied cross-certification.
In Majoewsky v. Indian Hill Exempted Village School District Board
of Education,' an individual held a professional elementary certificate
11 No. C-74527 (Ohio 1st Dist. Ct. App. Sept. 8, 1975), cert. denied, No. 75-983
(Ohio Sup. Ct. Dec. 7, 1975). The First District Court of Appeals upheld its posi-
tion of rejecting cross-certification in the subsequent decision of Voss v. North-
west Local Bd. of Educ., No. C-790168 (Ohio 1st Dist. Ct. App. July 13, 1979). In
this decision a teacher was denied the right to cross-certify a professional
teaching certificate in the areas of health education, physical education, and
driver education with employment in occupational work adjustment for which
only a provisional certificate was held. The decision was decided entirely on the
prior Majoewsky decision, and once again no statutory interpretation was
presented, nor any additional explanation or rationale presented.
[Vol. 28:481
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but was employed as a guidance counselor (for which she held only a
provisional pupil personnel certificate) when she became eligible for a
continuing contract. Although the court determined that a guidance
counselor is a "teacher" for purposes of section 3319.11,25 it concluded
that she was not qualified as to certification since her professional cer-
tificate was not in the area in which she was employed."8 As a result, the
court rejected the concept of cross-:certification and refused to order the
board of education to issue a continuing contract to the individual.
The Majoewsky decision is specious in that the court offered no
statutory rationale as to why "qualified as to certification" implied that
the certification must be in the field in which the individual is employed.
Instead, the court merely rejected one rationale supporting cross-
certification as expounded in Haskins v. Union-Scioto Board of Educa-
tion.' The Haskins court rationalized that if cross-certification were
denied, a superintendent could prevent any teacher with multiple cer-
tificates from obtaining tenure by assigning that teacher to serve in the
area in which the teacher had no professional certificate.' In responding
to this rationale, Majoewsky noted that a superintendent could prevent
a teacher from obtaining tenure simply by failing to recommend the in-
dividual for re-employment and that Haskins had unjustifiably injected
the likelihood of bad faith upon the part of superintendents. Although
the Majoewsky court was completely justified in rejecting this rationale
in support of cross-certification as expounded by Haskins, it offered no
rebuttal of the more substantive rationales in support of cross-
certification which were also expounded by the Haskins court. For ex-
ample, Haskins examined in detail the legislative history of the re-
quirements for certification as eventually enacted in section 3319.11."
Haskins further examined other pertinent sections of Title 33 which
relate to tenure issues in instances in which an individual possesses
multiple certificates. In sum, eight pages of well-reasoned and ar-
ticulately presented statutory interpretation in support of cross-
certification remained completely unrebutted by the Majoewsky court.'
The attempt in Majoewsky to criticize the Haskins decision in support
of cross-certification is therefore both incomplete and unconvincing; Ma-
joewsky offered no statutory interpretation of its own in deciding the
statutory question of cross-certification and failed to rebut a very per-
suasive statutory interpretation upholding cross-certification.
No. C-74527, slip op. at 6.
Id. at 11.
No. 36315 (Ohio C.P. Ross County, Nov. 2, 1973), affd, No. 595 (Ohio 4th
Dist. Ct. App. July 20, 1974).
Id., slip op. at 22.
Id. at 15.
See No. C-74527, slip op. at 10.
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MajoeUsky also interpreted tne Ohio Supreme Court decision of Gandy
v. Board of Education3' as implicitly rejecting the concept of cross-
certification.2 In Gandy, an individual held hn eight-year professional
teaching certificate and a four-year provisional pupil personnel cer-
tificate. The individual was employed as a guidance counselor for
several years and, upon expiration of the four-year provisional pupil
personnel certificate, was rehired as a teacher under the still valid
eight-year professional teaching certificate. The individual then sought
tenure pursuant to section 3319.11, having "taught" three of the last
five years within the school system as a guidance counselor, holding a
professional certificate in the teaching area in which he was unqualifiedly
re-employed, and receiving no written notice from the board of educa-
tion that the re-employment was a limited contract. Importantly, the
issue of cross-certification was not before the court: the individual was
seeking a continuing contract while possessing a professional certificate
in teaching and upon being employed as a teacher in the field in which
the professional certificate was held. The court held that since the in-
dividual possessed a professional teaching certificate, he was entitled to
a continuing contract upon being rehired as a teacher. Unfortunately,
the court articulated this holding in an ambiguous manner when it con-
cluded: "He was thus, under the provisions of the first paragraph of Sec-
tion 3319.11, Revised Code, 'eligible for continuing service status' in the
school district when reemployed in the field for which he had such pro-
fessional certificate.","
Many Ohio courts have closely examined this statement since this
decision is the only Ohio Supreme Court decision which remotely
touches the concept of cross-certification." The Majoewsky court con-
cluded that this statement implied that if the individual had not been re-
employed in the field in which he had such professional certificate, then
the individual would not have been entitled to a continuing contract.'
The Majoewsky court stated: "Gandy, at least by implication, appears to
reject the concept of cross-certification. As we read the syllabus, Gandy
not only avoids support of cross-certification, but rather subscribes to
SI 26 Ohio St. 2d 115, 269 N.E.2d 605 (1971).
No. C-74527, slip op. at 10 (Ohio 1st Dist. Ct. App. Sept. 8, 1975).
u 26 Ohio St. 2d at 118, 269 N.E.2d at 607 (emphasis added).
, See Tucker v. Northridge Local School Dist. Bd. of Educ., No. CA 2552, slip
op. at 9 (Ohio 5th Dist. Ct. App. Mar. 29, 1979); Majoewsky v. Indian Hill Ex-
empted Village School Dist. Bd. of Educ., No. C-74527, slip op. at 16 (Ohio 1st
Dist. Ct. App. Sept. 8, 1975); Krolopp v. South Range Local School Dist. Bd. of
Educ., 47 Ohio App. 2d 208, 210, 353 N.E.2d 642, 644 (7th Dist. 1974); Iverson v.
Wooster City School Dist. Bd. of Educ., No. 1328, slip op. at 6 (Ohio 9th Dist. Ct.
App. Dec. 12, 1973); Haskins v. Union-Scioto Local Bd. of Educ., No. 36315, slip
op. at 24 (Ohio C.P. Ross County Nov. 2, 1973), affd sub nom. Union-Scioto Local
Bd. of Educ. v. State ex rel Haskins, No. 595 (Ohio 4th Dist. Ct. App. July 20,
1974).
1 No. C-74527, slip op. at 10.
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the logic that tenure requires a certification directly akin to a teacher's
field of experience.""
The better view, however, is that the Gandy dictum merely addresses
the fact situation peculiar to the case presented and that the court did
not intend for this statement to extend to situations in which cross-
certification was an issue. Since the question of cross-certification was
not before the court, at best the phrase can be construed as dictum. The
Gandy decision does not prohibit cross-certification and probably did
not intend to address the problem even in dictum. Accordingly, Ma-
joewsky's reliance on Gandy was misplaced and inappropriate.
In sum, the Majoewsky decision rejecting cross-certification is defi-
cient for the following three reasons: (1) it offers no statutory explana-
tion as to why cross-certification should not be permitted; (2) it fails to
rebut a well-researched legislative history of the Teacher Tenure Act
which was adopted by another district appellate court in support of
cross-certification; and (3) it inappropriately infers that the dictum of
the Ohio Supreme Court Gandy decision rejects the concept of cross-
certification.
Cross-certification was also prohibited in Wieging v. Board of Educa-
tion.7 Here an individual possessed a permanent certificate in typing
and was employed as a typing teacher under a series of limited con-
tracts. Although the individual would have been qualified to receive
tenure upon being re-employed to teach typing, he voluntarily entered
into a five year limited contract as a guidance counselor and principal.
Thereafter the board of education elected not to re-employ him as either
a teacher, guidance counselor, or principal. Although the individual
possessed only a provisional pupil personnel certificate and a provisional
high school principal certificate, he claimed entitlement to a continuing
contract on the basis of his permanent certificate in typing. The court
rejected this concept of cross-certification and held that the individual
was not entitled to a continuing contract.' In so doing, the court con-
W I&
55 Ohio App. 2d 110, 379 N.E.2d 605 (3d Dist. 1977).
This court formulated the following strict rule:
It is our conclusion that a teacher qualified as to certification and
qualified as to length of service in the school district, shall be eligible to
receive a continuing service contract to teach only in the area in which
that teacher possesses a professional, permanent or life certificate and
that when that teacher becomes voluntarily employed in a teaching field
other than that in which he or she holds such a certificate, she or he
waives entitlement to a continuing contract either until re-employed in
the field for which such certificate is held or until so certified in the field
in which he or she becomes voluntarily employed.
Id at 114, 379 N.E.2d at 607-08. Such a rule can retard or even prevent an in-
dividual's mobility within a school system, much to the detriment of the school
system and the individual. Further, such a rule can irreparably harm an in-
dividual who innocently fills a vacancy in the educational hierarchy, only to later
find that valuable tenure rights have been forfeited as a result.
1979]
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eluded that "qualified as to certification" is to be interpreted as mean-
ing that the individual must be properly certified in the area in which he
is employed at the time tenure is sought. The court's rationale for this
conclusion was that:
R.C. 3319.22, et seq., prescribe the certification of teachers by
certificates of various grades and various types. R.C. 3319.30
prohibits compensation to anyone "for the performance of duties
as teacher * * * who has not obtained a certificate of qualifica-
tion for the position." (Emphasis added.) R.C. 3319.11 makes
eligible for continuing service status those teachers qualified as
to length of service in the school district who are also "qualified
as to certification". R.C. 3319.08 prescribes that a continuing
contract "which shall remain in effect until the teacher resigns,
elects to retire, or is retired * * * or until it is terminated or
suspended shall be granted only to teachers holding profes-
sional, permanent, or life certificates.""
Given the statutes it cited, it is extremely difficult to determine ex-
actly how the Wieging court reached the conclusion that cross-
certification is prohibited. The court did not logically connect the
statutes. However, the court's "rationale" is subject to the interpreta-
tion which follows. First, section 3319.2240 establishes two categories of
certificates: grades and types. Grades of certificates consist of tem-
porary certificates, one-year vocational certificates, provisional cer-
tificates, professional certificates, and permanent certificates. Types of
certificates consist of kindergarten-primary, elementary, high school,
special, elementary principal, high school principal, supervisor,
superintendent, vocational, assistant superintendent, pupil-personnel,
local superintendent, and educational administrative specialists. Second,
section 3319.11 requires the individual to be "qualified as to certifica-
tion." This refers to section 3319.08, which requires that an individual
possess either a professional, permanent, or life certificate. Accordingly,
since section 3319.22 establishes both grades of certificates and types of
certificates, and since a particular grade of certificate is a prerequisite
to obtaining tenure (namely, the grade of professional, permanent, or
life), it follows by implication that the grade of certificate must be of the
type of certificate under which the individual is employed. Accordingly,
section 3319.11 requires that an individual possess a professional, per-
manent, or life certificate in the area in which he is employed.
Assuming this to be a fair interpretation of the court's rationale, a
rebuttal lies in the fact that only the grade of certification is related to
the requirements of tenure as established by section 3319.11. The grade
of certificate is related to tenure through section 3319.08. However,
Id at 114, 379 N.E.2d at 607.
40 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3319.22 (Page 1978).
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there is no statute in Title 33 which relates a particular type of cer-
tificate to tenure as established by section 3319.11. Legislators did not
intend to make a particular type of certificate a prerequisite to obtain-
ing tenure; therefore, the professional certificate need not relate to the
area of employment, so long as the correct grade of certificate is held in
some area. An individual is "qualified as to certification" for purposes of
section 3319.11 when the individual possesses a professional, perma-
nent, or life certificate in some area, though not necessarily in the field
in which the individual is employed.
There is no support for the court's contention that section 3319.30"
(which prohibits the compensation of anyone who has not obtained a cer-
tificate of qualification for the position held) requires the professional
certificate mandated by section 3319.08 to be in the position in which
the individual is employed. The obvious purpose of section 3319.30 is to
insure that an individual possess at least a provisional or temporary cer-
tificate before being allowed to teach.'2 This does not imply, by any
stretch of the imagination, that an individual certified in multiple fields
can obtain tenure only in the field in which a professional, permanent, or
life certificate is held.
Similarly, in Tucker v. Northridge Local School District Board of
Education," an individual possessing a professional certificate in biology
was employed as a guidance counselor upon becoming eligible for
tenure. The court rejected the concept of cross-certification and held
that since the individual possessed only a provisional certificate in pupil
personnel, the board of education was not required to renew his con-
tract. In support of this conclusion a rationale was established similar
to, but no more articulate than, that established by Wieging. The court
reasoned: (1) section 3319.22 establishes different types of certificates;"'
(2) section 3319.30 prohibits compensation of any person who has not ob-
tained a certificate of qualification for the position;' (3) section 3319.08
requires that a continuing contract shall be granted only to teachers
holding professional, permanent, or life certificates;" and (4) section
3319.11 permits tenure only to those teachers "qualified as to certifica-
tion."'7 Therefore, the court concluded, the professional certification
must relate to the area of employment.' 8 Again, the court has not sus-
' Id. § 3319.30.
OHIO ATT'Y GEN. Op. 57-1121 (1957) stated: "[Tihe purpose of certification re-
quirements is clearly to prevent the 'teaching of a school by an incompetent (or
unqualified) person,' and not to abridge their contract rights. .. "
,8 No. CA 2552 (Ohio 5th Dist. Ct. App. Mar. 29, 1979), appeal filed, No. 79-704
(Ohio Sup. Ct.).
" Id, slip op. at 5.
45 Id
" Id at 6.
' Id
"Id at 5.
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tained the conclusion it has reached. If an individual possesses only one
certificate, that certificate must relate to the area of employment or the
individual will be prohibited from receiving compensation by section
3319.30. However, it cannot be concluded from the statutes cited by the
court that when an individual possesses more than one certificate, the
professional certificate must relate to the area in which the individual is
employed.
Two common pleas decisions have also denied cross-certification. In
Lilly v. Green Board of Education"' the court assumed that the profes-
sional certificate must be held in the particular area in which the in-
dividual is employed.5 0 Unfortunately, an independent statutory ra-
tionale supporting the court's assumption was not articulated; the court
chose to follow the Wieging decision."1 In Woodrum v. Rolling Hills
Local Board of Education52 the court denied cross-certification without
conducting an examination of the relevant statutes.5
V. IN SUPPORT OF CROSS-CERTIFICATION
A. Cases in Support of Cross-certification
The following appellate courts have interpreted section 3319.11 as
permitting the practice of cross-certification in the acquisition of tenure.
1. Guidance Counselors
As noted, section 3319.11 establishes "teacher" status as a prere-
quisite to obtaining tenure.' The majority of Ohio courts which have
' No. CIV 77-218 (Ohio C.P. Scioto County Apr. 4, 1979). This case is to be ap-
pealed to the Ohio Fourth District Court of Appeals.
Id, slip op. at 4.
51 The court stated:
Also, the Court of Appeals for Putman County in 1977 in the case of
[Weiging] held that "When one, who would be entitled to receive a
continuing service contract as a teacher in an area where he holds a pro-
fessional teaching certificate, voluntarily becomes employed in an area
in which the certificate has no application, he waives entitlement to the
continuing contract."
Id at 5. Accordingly, this court decided to follow Wieging which may have been
decided incorrectly. For a discussion of Wieging, see notes 37-39 supra and ac-
companying text.
' No. 30201 (Ohio C.P. Guernsey County June 8, 1977).
' The court stated:
This Court holds that a Board of Education that grants a teacher enough
contracts under a provisional certificate in the field in which the
employee holds the provisional certificate but has not hired the teacher
in the field which she has a professional certificate does not come within
the provisions of Section 3319.11 and such employee is not qualified for
or entitled to continuing contract status.
Id, slip op. at 4.
1 See note 19 supra, and accompanying text.
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considered the question of whether a guidance counselor is a "teacher"
for continuing contract purposes have answered affirmatively.5
Although guidance counselors are not eligible to receive tenure as such,
their experiences as guidance counselors fall within the meaning of
"teacher" for purposes of Ohio Revised Code section 3319.11 and can be
utilized in satisfying the requirements for tenure in the school system."
The following cases have permitted cross-certification of a professional
teaching certificate with experience obtained as a guidance counselor to
fulfill the tenure requirements of section 3319.11.
In Krolopp v. South Range Local School District Board of Education,"
a teacher holding a professional elementary teaching certificate had
received a continuing contract from a prior school system. This prior
continuing contract made the teacher eligible for tenure in the new
system after having served only two years." The individual then served
as a guidance counselor for five years under three separate limited con-
tracts, possessing only a provisional pupil personnel certificate during
this employment. Upon the expiration of the last limited contract, the
board of education elected not to re-employ the individual as either a
guidance counselor or as a teacher. The individual then sought and
received the right to a continuing contract pursuant to section 3319.11.
After determining that the individual was a "teacher" for purposes of
section 3319.11, the court allowed cross-certification but qualified it as
follows:
[The] plaintiff is entitled to a continuing contract with [the board
of education] as a teacher pursuant to R.C. 3319.11 because of
plaintiff's professional elementary teaching certificate. This
does not mean that plaintiff is entitled to a continued employ-
" See Majoewsky v. Indian Hill Exempted Village School Dist. Bd. of Educ.,
No. C-74527 (Ohio 1st Dist. Ct. App. Sept. 8, 1975); Krolopp v. South Range Local
School Dist. Bd. of Educ., 47 Ohio App. 2d 208, 353 N.E.2d 642 (7th Dist. 1974);
Iverson v. Wooster City School Dist. Bd. of Educ., No. 1328 (Ohio 9th Dist. Ct.
App. Dec. 12, 1973); State ex tel Fox v. Board of Educ., 11 Ohio App. 2d 214, 229
N.E.2d 663 (2d Dist. 1966); Haskins v. Union-Scioto Local Bd. of Educ., No. 36315
(Ohio C.P. Ross County Nov. 2, 1973), aff'd sub nom. Union-Scioto Local Bd. of
Educ. v. State ex rel Haskins, No. 595 (Ohio 4th Dist. Ct. App. July 20, 1974);
OHIO ATT'Y GEN. Op. 73-045 (1973).
1 Guidance counselors are also certified as teachers. State Bd. Educ. Reg.
EDb-3301-21-15 states:
(B) Provisional certificate-The provisional school counselor's certificate
will be issued to the holder of a master's degree with twenty-four
semester hours (thirty-six quarter hours) of graduate work well
distributed over the following areas: ...
(7) [A]nd with evidence of a standard teaching certificate valid for
teaching in Ohio. ...
47 Ohio App. 2d 208, 353 N.E.2d 642 (7th Dist. 1974).
See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3319.11 1 (Page 1978), set out at note 8 supra.
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ment as a guidance counselor. R.C. 3319.01 provides that the
superintendent of schools has the authority to assign plaintiff to
a teaching position.59
Similarly, the Court of Appeals of Ross County also upheld the theory
of cross-certification in Union Scioto Local Board of Education v.
Haskins'0 Here the individual held an eight-year professional certificate
in the areas of health, physical education, slow learning, and remedial
reading. She was employed for three years as a social studies teacher
and held only temporary certification in this area during this period.
After completing her third year of employment, at which time she was
eligible to receive tenure in social studies, she was employed under a
two-year limited contract as a guidance counselor, holding a provisional
pupil personnel certificate. Upon the expiration of this two-year con-
tract she was re-employed as a counselor under an additional one year
limited contract. In response to her legal challenge, the court ordered
the board of education to issue her a continuing contract since she had
qualified for such pursuant to Ohio Revised Code section 3319.11, even
though her professional certificate was not in the field in which she was
employed. In so doing, the appellate court noted that a guidance
counselor is a "teacher" by definition in section 3319.09(A),"1 and,
therefore, an individual's experiences as a guidance counselor can be
utilized in satisfying the requirements of tenure as established by sec-
tion 3319.11.2
The Ashtabula County Court of Appeals also upheld the theory of
cross-certification in Rorabaugh v. Grand Valley Local School District
Board of Education.3 Here, although the individual possessed a profes-
sional certificate in the fields of health and physical education, when she
achieved eligibility for tenure she was employed as a guidance
counselor, an area in which she possessed only a provisional certificate.
The court felt that all the requirements for a continuing contract
established by section 3319.11 had been satisfied. The court noted that
section 3319.08 provides that "[a] continuing contract . . . shall be
granted only to teachers holding professional ... certificates", and that
this should not be interpreted as implying that a continuing contract
shall be granted only to a teacher holding a professional certificate in
' 47 Ohio App. 2d at 210-11, 353 N.E.2d at 644 (emphasis added).
® No. 595 (Ohio 4th Dist. Ct. App. July 20, 1974).
6' OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3319.09(A) (Page 1978).
Although the appellate decision was extremely brief, the common pleas
decision, Haskins v. Union-Scioto Local Bd. of Educ., No. 36315 (Ohio C.P. Ross
County, Nov. 2, 1973), provides an articulate and persuasive argument upholding
the concept of cross-certification. It is the only decision examining the legislative
history of Title 33.
" No. 933 (Ohio 11th Dist. Ct. App. June 26, 1978).
" OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3319.08 (Page 1978), set out at note 1 supra.
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the area in which the individual is employed upon becoming eligible for
tenure."5 The court felt that since there is an ambiguity as to whether
the certificate must be in the area of employment, this ambiguity should
be construed in favor of the teacher."
2. Teachers Who Change Teaching Areas
State ex rel Peet v. Westerville City Board of Education67 considers
the question of whether teaching experience in one academic area is suf-
ficient for tenure when combined with a professional certificate in a dif-
ferent teaching area. Although the individual possessed a professional
certificate in social studies, he was teaching auto mechanics under a pro-
visional certificate when he became eligible for tenure. In holding that
the teacher could cross-certify, and was thereby entitled to tenure, the
court noted that the board of education did not run any risk of having an
unqualified teacher obtaining tenure since the state regulations and re-
quirements of attaining a professional certificate assured that "the
holder of a professional certificate in comprehensive social studies (or
any other comprehensive field) is not a neophyte in that academic
area."" Although the court did not discuss section 3319.01, it can be
noted that this section allows the superintendent to assign the tenured
teacher to teach in the area under which the professional certificate is
held, thereby protecting the school system from being forced to con-
tinually re-employ a tenured teacher in an area in which only a provi-
sional certificate is held."
B. Policies in Support of Cross-certification
It has thus far been shown that Ohio courts are divided on the ques-
tion of whether a teacher may utilize a professional certificate in an
area in which the teacher is not employed to meet the statutory re-
quirements of tenure as established by section 3319.11. Three courts
have interpreted the phrase "qualified as to certification" as implying
No. 933, slip op. at 3.
" Id In support of this contention the court refers to Thurston v. Board of
Educ., 140 Ohio St. 512, 45 N.E.2d 604 (1942), which states:
Recently, in the case of State ex rel. Bishop v. Board of Education of Mt.
Orab Village School District., 139 Ohio St. 427, 40 N.E.2d 913, we had oc-
casion to consider and apply certain parts of the "Ohio Teachers' Tenure
Act" (Sections 7690-1 to 7690-8, General Code, 119 Ohio Laws 451), and
upheld them as a valid exercise of legislative power. We further in-
dicated that the act should be liberally construed in favor of those it was
designed to benefit.
140 Ohio St. at 514, 45 N.E.2d at 605.
67 No. 78CV-12-5895 (Ohio C.P. Franklin County June 7, 1979), appeal
docketed, No. 79-AP-571 (Ohio 10th Dist. Ct. App. July 20, 1979).
No. 78CV-12-5895, slip op. at 3.
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3319.01 (Page 1978), set out at text accompanying
note 76 infra.
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that a teacher must be certified in the area in which he or she is
employed."0 As has been demonstrated, these decisions are subject to
severe criticism.71 This note will now suggest additional rationales in
support of the concept of cross-certification.
1. Tenure: In a Specific Position or in the School System?
One of the major ambiguities of Ohio Revised Code section 3319.11 is
whether it establishes the requirements which must be satisfied to
receive tenure in a specific position of employment or whether it
establishes the requirements which must be satisfied to receive tenure
in the school system, a question not specifically addressed by section
3319.11. When an individual is certified in only one teaching area, these
two categories become one and no problem arises. The question is rele-
vant when an individual possesses multiple certificates.
Proponents of the position that section 3319.11 grants tenure in a
specific position will demand that all the requirements of section 3319.11
be satisfied for the particular area in which the individual is employed,
including the requirement of possessing a professional, permanent, or
life certificate, and will deny cross-certification. On the other hand, pro-
ponents of the position that section 3319.11 is designed to provide for
tenure in the school system, rather than in a particular position, will not
require that the professional certificate be held n. the area in which the
individual is employed since the individual is not seeking tenure for that
particular position. Such proponents will allow the possession of a pro-
fessional certificate in any area to satisfy the requirements of section
3319.11 and hence will allow cross-certification. Since the question of
whether section 3319.11 provides for tenure within the school system or
in a particular position is so related to the issue of cross-certification, it
is not surprising to discover that once again Ohio courts are divided.
The only Ohio case which has allowed an individual in possession of
multiple teaching certificates to obtain tenure in a specific position is
Beatley v. Indian Lake Local Board of Education."2 In this decision an
individual possessed professional teaching certificates in both elemen-
tary education and secondary pupil personnel upon becoming eligible
for tenure. After being employed as a high school guidance counselor
for three years, the individual was issued a continuing contract. Subse-
quently, the board of education sought to assign the individual to an
elementary teaching position but was ordered by the court to employ
the individual in the specific position of guidance counselor. The court
ignored the clear language of the employment contract whereby the in-
" Tucker v. Northridge Local School Dist. Bd. of Educ., No. CA 2552 (Ohio
5th Dist. Ct. App. Mar. 29, 1979); Wieging v. Board of Educ., 55 Ohio App. 2d 110,
379 N.E.2d 605 (3d Dist. 1977); Majoesky v. Indian Hill Exempted Village School
Dist. Bd. of Educ., No. C-74527 (Ohio 1st Dist. Ct. App. Sept. 8, 1975).
71 See notes 24, 37, 43 supra and accompanying text.
No. 8-79-2 (Ohio 3d Dist. Ct. App. Nov. 16, 1979).
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dividual agreed "[To] teach in the Public Schools of said District from
the date of this Contract until she resigns, elects to retire, is retired
pursuant to law, or until said Contract is terminated or suspended as
provided by law. 78 Instead, the court reasoned that since the minutes of
the board of education's resolution to issue the individual a continuing
contract referred to employment as "High School Guidance"7" and did
not mention any alternate teaching field for which she was certified, the
superintendent was precluded from reassigning the individual to
another education area even though the individual possessed alternate
certification. After an examination of several sections of Title 33, the
court established the following rule: "[W]hen a teacher is re-employed
on a continuing contract such continuing contract must have relation to
the teaching field contemplated by such employment and to which the
teacher holds proper certification, and the contract has no relation to
another field, though proper certification exists, to which the employ-
ment does not relate. 75
Although one can empathize with the individual teacher who in this
case was asked to relinquish a position as a high school guidance
counselor for the new and radically different position of elementary
school teacher, the rule established by the court creates a dangerous
precedent and leaves many unresolved questions. It virtually eliminates
the power of the superintendent to assign teachers as provided for by
section 3319.01: "The superintendent of a local, city, county, or exemp-
ted village school district shall be the executive officer for the board.
Except as otherwise provided in this section for local school districts, he
shall direct and assign teachers and other employees of the schools
under his supervision.""
The Beatley decision severely limits the superintendent's clear
statutory authority to assign teachers. If the continuing contract refers
to only one professional certificate, the superintendent would be totally
precluded from reassigning the individual to an alternate position for
which certification is held. Further, if the individual's continuing con-
tract is a form contract which is employed by many school districts, the
superintendent may be forced to refer to the minutes of the board of
education in determining to which, if any, alternate positions the in-
dividual may be assigned. Not only is such a requirement time-
consuming, it may also prove unfruitful: for example, how is a
superintendent to determine the perimeters of an individual's continu-
ing contract when the contract is a form contract and the minutes of the
board of education reveal no discussion of the individual's certification?
71 Id, slip op. at 2 (emphasis added).
Id at 9.
7 Id at 10 (emphasis added).
76 OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 3319.01 (Page 1978) (emphasis added).
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Similarly, how is the superintendent to resolve assignability of an
employee when the board of education minutes reveal that several cer-
tificates were mentioned and yet a general continuing contract was
issued to the individual "to teach in said school district"? Also unresolved
by Beatley is the situation in which the teacher desires to be reassigned
to an area in which another certificate is held, one different from the
certificate mentioned in the continuing contract or in the board of
education meeting. Must the board of education issue a new continuing
contract before it can reassign the individual? If the board of education
does not issue a new continuing contract and yet employees the in-
dividual in a position which was not referred to in the continuing con-
tract, can the individual later force the board of education to re-employ
him in his original area?
In sum, the only Ohio court which has interpreted section 3319.11 as
providing for tenure in a specific position has established a dangerous
precedent in contradiction of the statutory right of the superintendent
to assign school employees as provided for by section 3319.01.
In opposition to Beatley, the conclusion that section 3319.11 was
designed to allow for obtaining tenure in the school system, rather than
in a particular position, has support in the wording of section 3319.11, in
case law, and in other statutes.
The Teacher Tenure Act, Ohio Revised Code section 3319.11, does not
provide on its face for obtaining tenure in a specific position within the
school system. Instead, it provides: "Teachers eligible for continuing
service status in any school district shall be those teachers qualified as
to certification, who within the last five years have taught for at least
three years in the district .... ," Thus the Beatley decision is contrary
to the plain language of the statute.
The majority of cases which have considered the question of whether
section 3319.11 establishes tenure in a school system or in a particular
position have denied the granting of tenure in a particular position. In
cases in which an administrator such as a principal, assistant superin-
tendent, or superintendent have sought tenure in those specific areas,
such tenure has been denied. In considering these cases, the courts had
to first determine if such administrators were indeed "teachers" for
purposes of section 3319.11, which begins: "Teachers eligible for contin-
uing service status in any school district shall be those teachers
qualified as to certification ... 1"7 In Ohio a "teacher" is defined in terms
of certification, rather than in terms of employment duties. Ohio Revised
Code section 3319.09 states: "(A) "Teacher" means all persons certified
to teach and who are employed in the public schools of this state as in-
structors, principals, supervisors, superintendents, or in any other
education position for which the state board of education requires cer-
77 Id § 3319.11 (emphasis added), set out at note 8 supra.
71 Id (emphasis added).
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tification. . ... -" Although this statutory definition of teacher would
seem to unqualifiedly place guidance counselors, principals, and super-
intendents within the meaning of "teacher" as used in section 3319.11,
such inclusion has been judicially qualified.
The Ohio Supreme Court has held that a superintendent does not
have the status of a "teacher" within section 3319.11 insofar as the in-
dividual attempts to seek tenure in the specific position of superinten-
dent. In State ex reL Saltsman v. Burton' (Saltsman 1), a superinten-
dent possessed a permanent certificate entitling him to serve as a
superintendent. After a series of employments as superintendent, dur-
ing which time the individual would have been entitled to a continuing
contract, the board of education elected not to rehire him. The in-
dividual then claimed a right to a continuing contract as a superinten-
dent, which would in turn mandate his automatic re-employment. The
court held that the individual was not entitled to tenure as a superinten-
dent even though all of the requirements of section 3319.11 had been
satisfied, basing its decision on the fact that other statutory provisions
precluded a right to tenure for superintendents. The court reasoned
that Ohio Revised Code section 3319.0181 allowed the board of education
to appoint a superintendent for a term not longer than five years.2 The
court also noted that the superintendent of a school district could
recommend the re-employment of a "teacher" under section 3319.11.3
Accordingly, if a superintendent were to be considered a "teacher" for
tenure purposes, he could recommend himself for re-employment under
a continuing contract. To permit such a result would be improvident,
and the court felt that the statutes should be interpreted so as to avoid
such a possibility." The court also reasoned that one basic purpose of
the Teacher Tenure Act was to prevent the termination of teachers
resulting from changes in the personnel or political complexion of
boards of education and concluded that a superintendent needs no such
protection." Finally, the court noted that the position of superintendent
consisted entirely of executive and discretionary functions and entailed
no actual "teaching."8 A similar rationale was employed in Frank v.
79 Id. § 3319.09.
" 154 Ohio St. 262, 95 N.E.2d 377 (1950). The Ohio Supreme Court upheld its
decision of Saltsman I two years later in State ex reL Saltsman v. Burton, 156
Ohio St. 537, 103 N.E.2d 740 (1952) (Saltsman II). In this case the same individual
sought entitlement to a vacant position of elementary supervisor. The court
denied such entitlement, stating: "[If teachers alone are entitled to continuing
contracts, it is immaterial what administrative position the relator is seeking."
I& at 539, 103 N.E.2d at 741.
81 The court cited G.C. 4842, recodified as Ohio Revised Code section 3319.01.
82 154 Ohio St. at 265, 95 N.E.2d at 378.
3 The court cited G.C. 4842-8, recodified as Ohio Revised Code section
3319.11.
154 Ohio St. at 268, 95 N.E.2d at 380.
Id. at 266-67, 95 N.E.2d at 379.
88 Id.
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Meigs County Board of Education,87 which held that an assistant
superintendent possessed no rights under the Teacher Tenure Act to
obtain tenure in the particular position of assistant superintendent.
Similarly, an individual cannot utilize section 3319.11 to acquire ten-
ure as a principal. In Ross v. Board of Education," the Cuyahoga County
Court of Appeals held that although the Teacher Tenure Act confers
specified protections based on certification and experience, it does not
provide for tenure as a principal." Unlike the Saltsman I court, the Ross
court cited no statutes which implied the preclusion of the right to ten-
ure for principals. Instead, it excluded tenure rights for principals solely
on the basis that the position consists of executive, administrative, and
supervisory functions." Since the individual's job description included
only these functions, as opposed to teaching functions, the position was
not one covered by the Teacher Tenure Act.9
In sum, superintendents and principals are not "teachers" for pur-
poses of section 3319.11 when tenure is sought for the specific position
of superintendent or principal, even though section 3319.11 addresses
tenure rights of "teachers" and even though section 3319.09(A) defines
principals and superintendents as teachers.
The question now arises as to whether superintendents and principals
should be included within the meaning of "teacher" for purposes of sec-
tion 3319.11 to enable them to qualify for tenure in the school system.
Obviously, if the individual possessed tenure as a teacher prior to
accepting the new position of superintendent or principal, that tenure is
retained upon the subsequent refusal to re-employ the individual for the
140 Ohio St. 381, 44 N.E.2d 455 (1942).
" 52 Ohio App. 2d 28, 367 N.E.2d 1209 (8th Dist. 1977).
Id at 30, 367 N.E.2d at 1211.
Id at 31, 367 N.E.2d at 1212.
Although the result of Ross may be desirable, its rationale can be seriously
questioned. Ohio Revised Code section 3319.09(A), see note 61 supra, clearly
defines a principal as a teacher. Further, the argument that a principal is not
really a "teacher" since the position encompasses no actual "teaching" is specious
in light of the clear and unambiguous statutory definition of teacher in terms of
certification rather than in terms of duties. Although Saltsman I stressed the
non-teaching aspects of a superintendent, it is unclear exactly how much weight
the court attributed to this argument. Further, if the purpose of the Teacher
Tenure Act was correctly stated in Saltsman I as preventing termination of
employment resulting from changes in the personnel or political complexion of
boards of education, then principals, unlike superintendents who are themselves
hiring authorities, should not be precluded from obtaining tenure since they
would certainly need such protection.
Perhaps a more persuasive argument for the court's position is that no in-
dividual in a school system is entitled to tenure in a specific position since Ohio
Revised Code section 3319.01 enables the superintendent to assign an individual
to any position for which the individual is certified. See note 76 supra and accom-
panying text. Since a prerequisite for obtaining a principal's certificate is the
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new position. 2 The more interesting situation arises when the individ-
ual did not possess tenure as a teacher prior to being employed in the
position of superintendent or principal and subsequently alleges that
the tenure requirements of section 3319.11 have been fulfilled through
the administrative experiences.
In Franks" and Saltsman I," the two cases which held that superin-
tendents are not entitled to tenure in that position, tenure was not
sought alternatively as a teacher. Similarly, in Ross," which held that a
principal is not entitled to receive tenure as a principal, the individual
had acquired tenure as a teacher prior to accepting the position of prin-
cipal and was entitled to retain the teacher tenure upon not being re-
employed as a principal.
The only Ohio decision to date which considers whether a principal
may cross-certify a professional teaching certificate with administrative
experiences in order to acquire tenure in the school system is Curry v.
Grand Valley Local Board of Education."' The individual had not re-
ceived tenure in any school system prior to entering the Grand Valley
school system, although she did possess a Permanent Elementary Prin-
cipal Certificate and a Permanent Elementary Education Certificate.
She was employed by Grand Valley as an elementary principal for three
years under two separate limited contracts without having ever been
employed as a teacher in the system. Upon the expiration of this last
limited contract, the board of education elected not to re-employ her as
either a teacher or a principal but failed to give her timely notice. Curry
then sought judicial renewal of her employment pursuant to section
3319.11, and the court ordered the board of education to furnish Curry
"a contract of employment"' 7 but did not specify whether the contract
was to be limited or continuing. Since the next school year had expired
prior to the court's decision, the board of education paid Curry the
possession of a teaching certificate, State Bd. Educ. Reg. EDb-3301-21-04 the
superintendent retains the authority to assign the principal in a teaching position
upon expiration of a contract.
" This situation is best illustrated in Ross v. Board of Educ., 52 Ohio App. 2d
28, 367 N.E.2d 1209 (8th Dist. 1977), where the court held that since the in-
dividual possessed teacher tenure prior to her appointment as a principal, she
was entitled to a continuing contract as a teacher upon the subsequent failure to
employ her as a principal. A similar rationale would also apply to
superintendents, although no reported decision in Ohio addresses the matter.
"See note 87 supra and accompanying text.
See note 80 supra and accompanying text.
See note 88 supra and accompanying text.
" No. 887 (Ohio lth Dist. Ct. App. Mar. 26, 1979). Upon appeal as a matter of
right to the Ohio Supreme Court, the merits of cross-certification were not
received since the discussion was limited to contempt charges. See filings in 61
Ohio St. 2d 314 (1980).
" No. 887, Journal entry, June 26, 1979.
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amount she would have received under the court-ordered contract and
then timely refused to give her a contract for the following year, believ-
ing itself to be in full compliance with the court order. In a subsequent
suit Curry then sought and received the right to a continuing contract.
However, the court did not specifically order the board of education to
issue the individual a continuing contract as a principal. It stated in
general terms: "We find, therefore, that the respondent Board of Educa-
tion is in contempt of this Court's order of July 5, 1977, by failing to
issue a continuing contract to the relator for the academic year 1976-
1977 as a successor contract to the agreement which expired only July
31, 1976.""l From this general order it can be assumed that the board of
education retained the option of issuing the individual a continuing con-
tract as a teacher or as a principal since the individual possessed a per-
manent certificate in both areas. At best the individual was entitled to
tenure in the school system rather than in a particular position.
From these Ohio Supreme Court and appellate cases we can conclude
that section 3319.11 has been judicially interpreted as allowing for ob-
taining tenure in a school system rather than in a particular position, at
least in the special case of administrators."
Finally, a reading of several other statutes yields the conclusion that
section 3319.11 allows for obtaining tenure in the school system. Section
3319.01, which allows the superintendent to assign a teacher to any posi-
tion in which the teacher is certified, also implies that tenure is granted
in the school system."' Application of section 3319.01 is best illustrated in
State ex reL Fox v. Board of Education.' Here an individual possessing
certificates in pupil personnel and teaching was unable to resist the
superintendent's mandate that she return to the position of a classroom
teacher from the position of guidance counselor, pursuant to the super-
intendent's power of assignment granted by section 3319.01.
Section 3319.17 has been noted as implying that tenure is not given
for a specific position."2 This section, which provides for teacher layoff
procedures, states: "Teachers, whose continuing contracts are sus-
pended, shall have the right of restoration to continuing service status
in the order of seniority of service in the district if and when teaching
positions become vacant or are created for which any of such teachers
Id at 6.
See note 55 supra and accompanying text. As has been noted, Krolopp v.
South Range Local School Dist. Bd. of Educ., 47 Ohio App. 2d 208, 353 N.E.2d 642
(7th Dist. 1974) also allowed for tenure in the school system, rather than in the
particular position of guidance counselor.
10 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3319.01 (Page 1978), set out at note 91 supra.
101 11 Ohio App. 2d 214, 229 N.E.2d 663 (2d Dist. 1966).
102 Haskins v. Union-Scioto Local Bd. of Educ., No. 36315, slip op. at 21 (Ohio
C.P. Ross County 1977), aff'd sub nom. Union-Scioto Local Bd. of Educ. v. State ex
reL Haskins, No. 595 (Ohio 4th Dist. Ct. App. July 20, 1974).
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are or become qualified."' 3 This seems to imply that a laid-off teacher
with tenure would be entitled to continue teaching in a school system in
an open field even though that teacher possessed only a temporary or
provisional certificate in that open field.
Since there is a very persuasive argument that section 3319.11 is
designed to provide for tenure in the school system rather than in a par-
ticular position, it would be improvident to require that the professional
certificate be held in the area in which the individual is employed
because the individual is not seeking tenure for that particular position.
Section 3319.11 is designed to allow the possession of a professional cer-
tificate in any area to satisfy its tenure requirements, preserving the
ability to cross-certify.
2. Minimal Harm to the School System
Although an individual teacher may be seriously injured by constru-
ing any inherent statutory ambiguity against him or her by not allowing
cross-certification, a school system would sustain comparatively little in-
jury by allowing a teacher to obtain tenure by cross-certifying. This
proposition is justified by section 3319.01 which allows the superin-
tendent to assign a teacher to any position for which the teacher is cer-
tified. '°' Once cross-certification has been allowed, the superintendent
can assign the teacher to the position in which a professional certificate
is held. The school system is never forced to employ a teacher with ten-
ure in an area in which the teacher possesses only a provisional certifi-
cate.' 5 There is little argument to be made, therefore, in support of the
'03 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3319.17 (Page 1978) (emphasis added).
o Id § 3319.01, set out in text accompanying note 76 supra.
The logical counterargument to this is that an individual could possess a
professional certificate in an area in which he or she is not employed and a provi-
sional certificate in the area in which he or she is employed. After acquiring
tenure, the individual can allow his or her professional certificate to expire,
renew only his or her provisional certificate, and thereby force the superinten-
dent to continually employ him or her in an area in which only a provisional cer-
tificate is held. This would violate Ohio Revised Code section 3319.01, which
allows the superintendent to assign teachers. By allowing certain certificates to
expire while renewing others, an individual could assign himself or herself to the
position desired. This argument is specious for three reasons.
First, such a practice contradicts the very idea of tenure since a similar situa-
tion could exist without cross-certification; an individual could acquire tenure
under a professional certificate, become certified in a new field, and allow his cer-
tificate in the original teaching field to expire. Such a practice, if allowed, would
bring the Teacher Tenure Act, section 3319.11 which allows the superintendent
to assign teachers, into direct conflict with section 3319.01.
Second, a rebuttal to this argument lies in the fact that the board of education
may possess adequate grounds for the firing of an individual who would refuse to
renew his professional certificate pursuant to Ohio Revised Code section 3319.16,
which states: "The contract of a teacher may not be terminated except for gross
inefficiency or immorality; for wilful and persistent violations of reasonable
1979]
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proposition that tenure should not be granted to an individual simply
because the individual possesses only a provisional certificate in the
area in which he or she is employed upon becoming eligible for tenure.
3. Public Policy
Public policy supports the proposition that cross-certification should
be permitted. Allowing tenure in the school system, rather than in a
particular field, promotes mobility within the system. This mobility is
needed to fill the positions of guidance counselors, principals, super-
visors, and superintendents. It is undesirable to require an individual to
remain in one position until tenure is received before employment in
another position can be sought. It is also undesirable to allow a teacher
to lose his statutory right to tenure simply because he has filled a
vacancy in the educational hierarchy.
The question of cross-certification can be avoided by the board of
education through timely notice as required by section 3319.11 in in-
stances in which the board of education wishes to terminate the employ-
ment of a marginal teacher. The board of education can also avoid the
regulations of the board of education; or for other good and just cause." OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 3319.16 (Page 1978) (emphasis added).
Whether a teacher's refusal to renew a teaching certificate constitutes "just
cause" for termination of employment is unanswered in Ohio. In Dorian v. Euclid
Bd. of Educ., No. 37708 (Ohio 8th Dist. Ct. App. Mar. 3, 1978), an individual
possessed certification in psychology and French upon receiving a continuing con-
tract. The individual was employed as a psychologist for several years and did
not renew her French teaching certificate upon its expiration. Subsequently, the
board of education sought to re-employ the individual as a teacher because a
declining school enrollment resulted in a need for fewer psychologists. The in-
dividual refused to renew her French teaching certificate upon the board's re-
quest and further refused to return to a teaching capacity. The appellate court
held that the individual had a right under the continuing contract to be
reinstated as a school psychologist with full back pay since the board of education
had not taken any action to terminate the individual's continuing contract pur-
suant to Ohio Revised Code section 3319.16. In so holding the court stated: "We
express no opinion as to whether or not her failure to file an application for cer-
tification constituted just cause for dismissal pursuant to R.C. 3319.16." Id., slip
op. at 6, n.1. This court at least hinted that an individual's refusal to renew a
teaching certificate may constitute grounds for dismissal pursuant to section
3319.16. Dorian is to be appealed to the Ohio Supreme Court.
Third, there is reason to believe that the board of education could itself renew
the individual's certificate without first receiving the individual's request or per-
mission. As to the renewal of professional certificates, section 3319.25 states:
"The state board of education may convert any provisional certificate or renewal
thereof into a professional certificate of like type valid for eight years, provided
the applicant has met the standards of preparation, experience, and teaching suc-
cess set by the board for the conversion applied for." OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
3319.25 (Page 1978) (emphasis added). Interestingly, the renewal of a professional
certificate does not require that the individual must request such renewal. A
similar argument is not required for an individual possessing a permanent cer-
tificate since such needs no renewal.
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problem of cross-certification through an extensive evaluation of a
teacher's abilities during the individual's first three years of employ-
ment. It would be beneficial to the individual and the school system if
the board of education could agree on whether the individual is of bene-
fit to the school system and should be retained. This should be done
even with individuals who are not eligible for tenure. This practice will
then eliminate situations in which a marginal teacher is employed for
ten years under a series of limited contracts, obtains a professional cer-
tificate after the tenth year of employment, and becomes eligible for
tenure; at this point the board of education is forced to either terminate
the individual's employment or issue a continuing contract. It can be
argued that no individual should be placed in a position of non-re-
employment after ten years of service; the board of education should
make a determination as to the individual's merits prior to this occasion.
In sum, since the board of education possesses all that is needed to
avoid problems of cross-certification issues in the courts, it is improvi-
dent to thereafter uphold the board of education which has, through its
own negligence and ineffective policies, promoted the very situation
which can result in irreparable harm to the individual teacher.
VI. CONCLUSION
During the last few decades, many teachers have lost their valuable
tenure rights, and others have retained theirs only after extensive liti-
gation, because the concept of cross-certification is not specifically ad-
dressed by Title 33. Although the Teacher Tenure Act does not prohibit
cross-certification, some appellate courts have concluded that tenure is
only to be acquired in a specific position within the school system, and
not in the system itself, and have accordingly held that tenure should
not be acquired by an individual who does not possess a professional
certificate in the area of employment even though that individual does
possess the requisite certification in another area. Not only do these
cases contradict the purpose of tenure and the need for mobility within
a school system, they also contradict many of the sections of Title 33
and introduce a requirement into section 3319.11 which was never
specifically stated. The rationale used in these cases is both inarticulate
and dubious. Unfortunately, on three occasions the Ohio Supreme Court
has denied certiorari to decisions which have considered the concept of
cross-certification.'
Both the proponents and opponents of cross-certification must con-
clude that the statutes are vague and ambiguous and have left many
unresolved questions. Accordingly, the appellate courts of Ohio are
hopelessly in conflict. It is obvious that legislative clarity is direly
needed. Both the individual teacher and the board of education are enti-
106 See notes 24, 37, 43 supra.
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tled to a statutory framework which resolves the many ambiguities
which presently exist in Title 33. We can but hope that the Ohio Legisla-
ture will soon clarify the ambiguities in this area. Since no section of
Title 33 prohibits the practice of cross-certification, few modifications
need be made to correct this particular ambiguity. The easiest method
to eliminate future judicial uncertainty would be to specifically define
cross-certification in Ohio Revised Code section 3319.11 and address its
validity.
Alternately, key phrases of section 3319.11 can be clarified so as to
unquestionably allow for the concept of cross-certification. A suggested
modification is:
Teachers eligible for continuing service status in a school sys-
tem shall be those teachers who possess either a professional,
permanent, or life certificate, and who within the last five years,
have served for at least three years in the district, though not
necessarily in the area in which their professional permanent or
life certificate is held, and those teachers who, having attained
continuing contract status elsewhere, though not necessarily in
the area in which they are employed, have served two years in
the district, but the board of education, upon the recommenda-
tion of the superintendent of schools, may at the time of employ-
ment or at any time within such two-year period, declare any of
the latter teachers eligible."7
JIM MICHAEL HANSEN
107 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3319.11 (Page 1978) (proposed changes and addi-
tions emphasized).
[Vol. 28:481
26https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol28/iss3/8
